I.. INTRODUCTION {#sec1}
================

Transplantation medicine finds itself at a crossroads in terms of public policy, as today\'s legal frameworks for organ donation are inadequate to deal with a challenging reality. Despite the implementation of various measures over the years, the disparity between the number of organs donated and the needs of patients continues to grow throughout the developed world.^[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"}^ The number of organs to treat patients on the waiting list is insufficient, and it is ever more so.

Given the serious organ shortage, there are fierce debates about a legally and ethically acceptable way of promoting organ donation. Traditional scholarship has dealt with the question of reforming current organ procurement systems along the lines dividing altruism and market-based approaches, or the gift versus market dichotomy.^[2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"}^ Proponents of altruistic donation, on the one hand, defend the myth of donation as a selfless, altruistic act and oppose changes to the current system. Market advocates, on the other hand, see no obstacle in considering organs as tradable goods and praise the beneficial consequences of an increased number of available organs. This dichotomy has yet to be overcome.

However, there is an alternative approach to reduce the shortfall in organs: incentivized donation, ie the state offering incentives to promote individuals' willingness to donate. In a report published in 2011,^[3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"}^ the UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics for example claims that the state plays a role in encouraging individuals to donate their organs. Although altruism should continue to be at the heart of donation as it underpins important community values, this does not exclude the possibility of reward. The Nuffield Council states that body parts should not be 'bought' or 'sold' directly, ie exchanging money in direct return for body parts. Going beyond the gift versus market dichotomy, it considers favorably though the concept that the state rewards donors for their act and offers incentives as an ethical way of encouraging donation. The scholarly literature also increasingly debates incentives from the angles of medicine, law, philosophy, economy, and bioethics, although rarely from the perspective of public policy focusing on the role of the state.^[4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"}^

In this paper, we refer to the analytical framework of public policy to explore the organ shortage, its consequences, and state incentives as possible remedies. The paper uniquely bridges a theoretical analysis of the foundations of state intervention in organ donation with reflections on the compatibility of incentives with normative constraints such as the prohibition of organ sales.

Analysing empirical data on its causes and consequences, we define the organ shortage as a public health problem (Section II). State incentives are a successful regulatory tool in other areas of public health. We thus dissect the conceptual underpinnings and normative justifications of a public policy promoting organ donation based on incentives. Also, we integrate sociological findings as to the nature of the act of donation---the concept of reciprocity most importantly---into considerations on the core attributes of such a public policy. We argue that state incentives rewarding individuals' willingness to donate, as an expression of society\'s appreciation of a generous and solidary act, are more appropriate than the current system of altruistic donation (Section III). To address regulatory design questions, we present various state incentives and then focus on Israel\'s allocation priority for registered donors, the first incentive successfully implemented on a state level (Section IV). We also discuss legal and ethical concerns raised by incentivized organ donation. Presenting the necessary safeguards to be implemented, we define the legal and ethical framework in which a regulated system of state incentives can operate in a safe, fair, and effective manner (Sections V and VI). Finally, we focus on aspects neglected so far in public information campaigns and discuss the interaction between state policy and public opinion (Section VII).

Regulation of organ donation and transplantation remains a competence firmly attached to the realm of the nation-state. The organ shortage constitutes a recurrent phenomenon all over the developed world though. Conceptual and normative reflections on the design of public policies based on incentives are thus valid beyond the limited analysis of one state\'s legal framework. They may constitute the foundation for political action and regulatory change in various national contexts. This is not to say that local and cultural particularities and sensitivities, as related to the body, its parts, and death, may be ignored when designing such public policies.

II.. TRANSPLANTATION MEDICINE'S CHALLENGING REALITY {#sec2}
===================================================

II.A.. Organ shortage and its causes {#sec2-1}
------------------------------------

The organ shortage can be defined as a mismatch between demand and offer for organs. In the developed world, the availability of organs to treat patients in need is insufficient. The member states of *Eurotransplant*, for example, presented a combined waiting list of 14,773 patients in 2017, compared to 7207 organs from dead and living donors transplanted in 2017.^[5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"}^ In the USA, 114,734 patients were waiting for a new organ in March 2018, while a total of 34,771 organs from dead and living donors were transplanted in 2017.^[6](#fn6){ref-type="fn"}^ While the number of patients on the waiting list has steadily increased over the years, the number of organ donors has remained almost invariably low. As a consequence, there is a widening gap between these two variables defining the extent of activities in transplantation medicine.

The rise of patients waiting for an organ is due to various factors. First, transplantation medicine is a success story. Over the years, organ transplantation has developed from an experimental treatment into an effective medical intervention in terms of patient and graft survival.^[7](#fn7){ref-type="fn"}^ Patients suffering from organ failure thus demand access to this beneficial treatment option. Second, demographic changes also have an impact.^[8](#fn8){ref-type="fn"}^ General life expectancy is expanding, which creates a larger pool of patients needing an organ at some point in their lives.^[9](#fn9){ref-type="fn"}^ Third, public health factors play a significant role too, as more and more individuals suffer from modern civilization diseases.^[10](#fn10){ref-type="fn"}^ Unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, and excessive consumption of alcohol contribute to the growing prevalence of obesity, high blood pressure, and type 2 diabetes. These conditions may eventually lead to organ failure. Individual lifestyle and risk behavior are thus a contributory or even causal factor of the organ shortage.^[11](#fn11){ref-type="fn"}^

II.B.. Organ shortage and its consequences {#sec2-2}
------------------------------------------

Despite the implementation of various measures over the years, the disparity between patients in need for a new organ and organs donated continues to grow in most parts of the developed world. The resulting organ shortage has many serious consequences.

The most tragic consequence is the premature death of patients on the waiting list. Waiting times from listing until transplantation continue to rise, as does list mortality.^[12](#fn12){ref-type="fn"}^*Eurotransplant* registered 1268 patients' deaths in 2017.^[13](#fn13){ref-type="fn"}^ In the USA,^[14](#fn14){ref-type="fn"}^ 5441 patients died while on the waiting list in the same year. These numbers do not include patients removed from the list because their condition deteriorates to a point at which organ transplantation is no longer an appropriate treatment option (estimated at 6364 patients in the USA in 2017).

The organ shortage also leads to impaired quality of life for waitlisted patients and their relatives. Today, about 75 percent of patients need a kidney.^[15](#fn15){ref-type="fn"}^ These individuals undergo dialysis several times a week for many hours. As such, dialysis has a drastic impact on the patients' professional and personal lives and affects their health condition more generally.

A declining success rate for transplantations is another consequence of the organ shortage.^[16](#fn16){ref-type="fn"}^ The longer a patient remains on the waiting list, the sicker he becomes. Organ transplantation occurring a long time after listing is usually less successful in terms of patient and organ survival. For patients in need of a kidney, in particular, the duration of dialysis has an adverse impact on the success rate of subsequent kidney transplantation.^[17](#fn17){ref-type="fn"}^

Furthermore, the organ shortage involves significant costs. Most patients need a kidney and rely on dialysis while waiting for a transplant. In Canada for example, hemodialysis costs about \$60,000 per patient per year compared to \$23,000 for a kidney transplantation plus \$6000 a year for lifelong medications.^[18](#fn18){ref-type="fn"}^ Prolonged dialysis thus entails important financial expenditures.^[19](#fn19){ref-type="fn"}^ Kidney transplantation is not only cheaper but also more successful in terms of patient survival. In fact, kidney transplantation is the most effective and cost-efficient treatment for end-stage renal disease.^[20](#fn20){ref-type="fn"}^ In addition, dialysis patients are rarely able to pursue a regular professional activity, whereas most kidney recipients regain their work capacity. The organ shortage hence also causes public spending on disability pensions for instance.^[21](#fn21){ref-type="fn"}^

Finally, the organ shortage gives rise transplant tourism and organ trafficking.^[22](#fn22){ref-type="fn"}^ Patients from developed countries---unable or unwilling to wait---travel to developing countries to buy kidneys on the black market. The poor and vulnerable local 'donors' are offered a sum they cannot refuse, but often do not receive the promised financial compensation, and usually remain without proper medical follow-up.^[23](#fn23){ref-type="fn"}^ Some US health insurers even offer a transplantation vacation abroad.^[24](#fn24){ref-type="fn"}^ These companies pay for the flight, the medical procedure, the organ, and all related costs because such a 'vacation' is cheaper than bearing the costs of prolonged dialysis.^[25](#fn25){ref-type="fn"}^ Health insurers justify their support of transplant tourism with cost-efficiency and cost-savings while ignoring the situation of the local organ 'donor'.^[26](#fn26){ref-type="fn"}^ The fact that some patients return from their trip abroad with post-transplantation complications (eg substandard surgery, infections, transmissible diseases) adds to this problematic situation. The costs of care for these patients are significant and probably contradict expectations of financial savings.^[27](#fn27){ref-type="fn"}^

III.. STEWARDSHIP ROLE OF THE STATE {#sec3}
===================================

III.A.. Public interests at stake {#sec3-1}
---------------------------------

Considering its serious consequences on patients and society, the organ shortage can be defined as a public health problem or a 'critical public health challenge'.^[28](#fn28){ref-type="fn"}^ This definition opens up the question of the state\'s responsibility in transplantation medicine.^[29](#fn29){ref-type="fn"}^

Saving human lives and improving the quality of life of patients waiting for an organ represent critical public interests.^[30](#fn30){ref-type="fn"}^ The literature also refers to compelling state interests in response to health needs.^[31](#fn31){ref-type="fn"}^ Beyond the language of interests, safeguarding lives can also be regarded as the central dogma of the constitutionally regulated state: 'the first duty of any state committed to the rule of law is to take responsibility for its people\'s lives'.^[32](#fn32){ref-type="fn"}^

The range of public interests at stake goes beyond addressing individual health needs tough. There is a public interest in improved donation rates to alleviate dependence on dialysis and lessen the cost burden on health care systems.^[33](#fn33){ref-type="fn"}^ Also, many transplant recipients can re-enter the workforce, thus reducing costs for social security systems.^[34](#fn34){ref-type="fn"}^ Finally, the fight against transplant tourism and organ trafficking also constitutes a public interest.^[35](#fn35){ref-type="fn"}^

Based on these important public interests, the state assumes multiple roles in transplantation medicine. The organ shortage is not a natural and unchangeable matter of fact. The role of the state can therefore hardly be limited to regulating and controlling organ quality, safety, and just allocation of organs. It is indeed also part of the state\'s role to encourage donation and increase the number of available organs.^[36](#fn36){ref-type="fn"}^ The state plays an essential role with regard to the availability of organs for transplantation.^[37](#fn37){ref-type="fn"}^

In its report, the Nuffield Council describes the role of the state as a one of 'stewardship': the 'concept of the state as steward of public health is equally applicable to the responsibilities of states with respect to the donation of bodily materials';^[38](#fn38){ref-type="fn"}^ and 'the state has a stewardship role in maximising the donation of bodily materials, where these have the potential to contribute to improved health'.^[39](#fn39){ref-type="fn"}^ Being a steward implies that the state has a duty to take action, including promoting donation. This stewardship role is reflected in the legal framework of the Council of Europe\'s *Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin* (hereafter: *Additional Protocol on Transplantation*).^[40](#fn40){ref-type="fn"}^ Article 19 enacts a legally binding international obligation for states to take 'all appropriate measures to promote the donation of organs'. It implies that states have a responsibility to ensure organ availability and establish a legal framework offering favorable conditions for increasing the number of organ donors.^[41](#fn41){ref-type="fn"}^

III.B.. Public policies to promote organ donation {#sec3-2}
-------------------------------------------------

In contrast to previous challenges, such as transplant rejection and the development of immunosuppressive drugs, the organ shortage is a public health problem that cannot be solved by medical and technological innovation within a reasonable timeframe. It is a problem that needs to be addressed through public policy and modified regulatory frameworks.

In public health, the state applies three types of public policy instruments to obtain a change in behavior within its population.^[42](#fn42){ref-type="fn"}^ First, the state can impose a change in behavior by law (regulation; eg obligation to wear a seatbelt or a motorcycle helmet). Second, the state can suggest a change in behavior using information (persuasion; *eg* public awareness campaigns). Third, the state can induce a behavioral change through positive or negative financial incentives (incitation; eg subsidies, tax breaks, duties).

For organ donation, states currently mainly use the first and second categories of public policy instruments. An important element of state action relates to the hospital setting. The detection of potential organ donors through standardized hospital procedures is decisive.^[43](#fn43){ref-type="fn"}^ Many states have introduced measures via regulation, such as imposing a transplant coordinator in hospital intensive care units, assigning a physician the role of detecting potential organ donors or establishing specific protocols for brain death determination.^[44](#fn44){ref-type="fn"}^

Another category of state action is information through public awareness campaigns.^[45](#fn45){ref-type="fn"}^ Public education is an aspect that is already implemented today to various degrees in different states.^[46](#fn46){ref-type="fn"}^ However, public awareness campaigns have not been particularly successful in increasing organ donation rates, albeit significant budgets invested over the years.^[47](#fn47){ref-type="fn"}^

Although information is a crucial tool in public health, it is rarely used on its own. Here an analogy to other public health problems, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, or unhealthy lifestyles and nutrition, is revealing. In these areas, states take action to promote desirable behavior. This action includes public health campaigns (eg slogans such as 'Drink less!', 'Don't smoke!', 'Exercise more!', 'Eat healthier!') and information about poor health outcomes. However, this information is always backed up by other measures designed to encourage desirable behavior, in particular, incentives such as taxes perceived on alcohol and tobacco sales, or consumption of unhealthy foods and drinks ('fat tax'; 'sugar tax').^[48](#fn48){ref-type="fn"}^

This opens up a third category of state action: promoting individuals' willingness to donate through incentives. Incentives are a common regulatory tool in various areas of social policy, particularly in public health. So far, policy makers have not seriously considered using incentives to address the organ shortage, however. We argue here that beyond the measures already in place, a public policy based on incentives is a most promising way forward.

III.C.. State incentives to honor the principles of reciprocity and solidarity {#sec3-3}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

State incentives are regulatory instruments to promote and reward organ donation in the context of a public policy. The purpose of incentives is to stimulate individuals' willingness to donate organs.^[49](#fn49){ref-type="fn"}^ We discuss here the core attributes of such a novel public policy.

Public surveys in the developed world reveal high public support for organ donation, as most individuals manifest a positive attitude toward donation.^[50](#fn50){ref-type="fn"}^ The medical reality has been different though, characterized by high abstention and refusal rates.^[51](#fn51){ref-type="fn"}^ The predominantly positive attitude only leads to few expressions of consent by the donor while alive or his relatives after death. The literature describes this phenomenon as an attitude/action gap.^[52](#fn52){ref-type="fn"}^ State incentives address this gap. They provide the necessary impetus to overcome individuals' laziness, apathy, inertia, or other barriers in expressing consent.^[53](#fn53){ref-type="fn"}^ Incentives thus act as a stimulus for the numerous individuals who are inclined to donate but have not taken action yet.^[54](#fn54){ref-type="fn"}^ As such, they have significant potential to alleviate the organ shortage.^[55](#fn55){ref-type="fn"}^

Organ donation is a generous act of solidarity of the donor or his relatives in favor of the recipient and society.^[56](#fn56){ref-type="fn"}^ Through incentives, the state can demonstrate appreciation and gratitude for this act. Arnold et al. note that 'the benefit (...) for donation should be perceived as an expression of gratitude on behalf of society for the gift'.^[57](#fn57){ref-type="fn"}^ This perception of gratitude is decisive in the context of incentives for organ donation. Incentives also allow the state to value the act of donation and publicly acknowledge this praiseworthy act.^[58](#fn58){ref-type="fn"}^ Furthermore, by communicating a message of appreciation and gratitude for a generous and solidary act, incentives speak to potential organ donors and their relatives not only through a rational and utilitarian channel but also include an emotion-based component.^[59](#fn59){ref-type="fn"}^

Incentives also take into account the concept of reciprocity, ie giving and receiving. Donation is commonly seen as a selfless act of altruism. From a sociological point of view, however, this popular image is not entirely accurate.^[60](#fn60){ref-type="fn"}^ According to the research of Mauss first published in 1923--1924, the gift relationship implies a circle of giving, receiving, and reciprocating.^[61](#fn61){ref-type="fn"}^ Reciprocity is thus a key element of the 'Maussian gift exchange theory'. Subsequent literature also notes that reciprocity is inherent in the act of donation, which is neither unidirectional nor one-sided.^[62](#fn62){ref-type="fn"}^ Schweda & Schicktanz, for example, refer to the social nature of organ donation as a reciprocal social interaction between different parties.^[63](#fn63){ref-type="fn"}^

Since they conceive donation as a unidirectional act, current organ procurement systems do not sufficiently take into account the symbolic meaning of the act of donation and its relational dimension. The disconnection from essential attributes of the act of donation and the gift relationship seems even more problematic considering that the gift involved here is a gift of life, which has its own significant meaning.^[64](#fn64){ref-type="fn"}^ Fox & Swazey describe in fact a potential tyranny of the gift, as the recipient of the gift of life is not in a position to express his gratitude and give something back.^[65](#fn65){ref-type="fn"}^ By employing incentives to promote organ donation, the state can re-equilibrate the gift relationship.^[66](#fn66){ref-type="fn"}^

In addition, the literature acknowledges that various motives underlie the act of organ donation.^[67](#fn67){ref-type="fn"}^ As Schweda & Schicktanz note: 'the strict dichotomy between the idea of purely altruistic donation and market-oriented models underlying much of the academic debate does not reflect the perceptions and conflicts of the affected persons'.^[68](#fn68){ref-type="fn"}^ Co-existence of altruistic intent and interest seems possible, or even conceptually inherent in the act of donation. A donor is rarely motivated by altruism alone. Altruism 'is one element of a donor\'s behavior, but the donation transcends altruism'.^[69](#fn69){ref-type="fn"}^ Well-conceived state incentives reflect the mixed motives underlying organ donation. They encourage altruism while offering a rewarding gesture of appreciation and gratitude.^[70](#fn70){ref-type="fn"}^ A system in which motivation to donate is based on altruism and interest is more coherent with regard to the conceptual and symbolic characteristics of the act of donation. Petersen & Lippert-Rasmussen note that 'tax credits can themselves be interpreted as gifts---from the state to individuals who have done something for the common good'; thus, 'tax credits may serve to increase the number of gift relations in society'.^[71](#fn71){ref-type="fn"}^

Finally, a public policy based on incentives enforces the prohibition of private commercial transactions involving money and organs. A government-regulated system sets barriers to prevent abuse, by (a) limiting incentives to residents and (b) maintaining current allocation practices, ie organs are allocated to the first patient on the waiting list, and not according to individual capacity or willingness to pay.^[72](#fn72){ref-type="fn"}^ It follows that incentivized organ donation does not raise distributive concerns as to the allocation of organs.

State incentives depart from current practices of altruism-based donation. The altruistic system has reached its limits though. State incentives also distinguish themselves from an organ market. As Sten notes, 'such incentives do not permit the buying or selling of organs as property, but instead appear as alternatives to altruism in rewarding the decision to consent to organ donation'.^[73](#fn73){ref-type="fn"}^ Considering the serious organ shortage, we have to conceive organ donation beyond the altruism/market dichotomy. There is a third way, reflecting the concept of incentivized donation; the reward being offered by the state as part of a public policy.^[74](#fn74){ref-type="fn"}^ Based on regulation and transparency, such a public policy strives for the highest level of safety, fairness, and equality, and thus offers the necessary donor and recipient protection.^[75](#fn75){ref-type="fn"}^

IV.. STATE INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE ORGAN DONATION: THE REGULATORY DESIGN {#sec4}
======================================================================

IV.A.. General remarks {#sec4-1}
----------------------

This section offers an overview of incentives rewarding consent to organ donation, their regulatory design, and examples of implementation in national settings. It is deliberately succinct as a lot has been written on this topic, although rarely from a public policy perspective.^[76](#fn76){ref-type="fn"}^ Although one may be skeptical about the moral or theoretical relevance of the distinction, we only refer here to the introduction of incentives, and not the removal of disincentives, which is also discussed in the literature and already realized in many legal frameworks regulating organ donation.^[77](#fn77){ref-type="fn"}^ Before presenting various incentives, a few introductory remarks are necessary as to the type of donation, addressees of incentives, and type of incentives involved.

Incentives for living donation are different from incentives for *post mortem* donation. The former focuses on the donor. For the latter, we distinguish between incentives for registration as a potential donor while alive (*ex ante* incentives), and incentives for actual consent to organ donation by relatives after a potential donor\'s death (*ex post* incentives).

There are three types of incentives: non-financial, indirect financial, and direct financial. Non-financial incentives relate to a patient\'s position on the waiting list.^[78](#fn78){ref-type="fn"}^ They grant a certain priority on the waiting list to patients based on their previously expressed willingness to donate their organs. Indirect financial incentives provide a symbolic reward, possibly spread over time, for the gesture of donation.^[79](#fn79){ref-type="fn"}^ Direct financial incentives offer a purchase price for an organ on the basis of a legally binding sales contract. Whereas non-financial and indirect financial incentives are a more recent phenomenon in scholarly discussions, market ideas circulate in the literature since as early as 1977.^[80](#fn80){ref-type="fn"}^

IV.B.. Non-financial incentives {#sec4-2}
-------------------------------

Allocation priority for registered donors and living donors are **'**non-financial incentives'.^[81](#fn81){ref-type="fn"}^

'Allocation priority for registered donors' offers priority status on the waiting list should a registered potential donor ever succumb to disease and need an organ transplant himself.^[82](#fn82){ref-type="fn"}^ Allocation priority thus gives preference to individuals on the waiting list who have earlier expressed their consent to donate their organs after death. Here the incentive consists of quicker access to an organ in case of need. The literature uses different terminologies to describe allocation priority, such as 'preferred status' or 'solidarity model'.^[83](#fn83){ref-type="fn"}^

Allocation priority for registered donors operates under a system of reciprocity or 'reciprocal altruism'.^[84](#fn84){ref-type="fn"}^ This incentive expresses the reciprocal and solidary concept of giving and receiving inherent in the act of donation.^[85](#fn85){ref-type="fn"}^ In doing so, it addresses the unfairness of having a significant part of the population unwilling to donate organs, but ready to receive them in case of need.^[86](#fn86){ref-type="fn"}^ Allocation priority also offers the advantage of retaining a link with health care.^[87](#fn87){ref-type="fn"}^

The incentive of allocation priority necessitates the creation of an official organ donor register.^[88](#fn88){ref-type="fn"}^ Such a register operates as a computerized electronic database that records and centralizes consent expressed by willing potential organ donors. The register is accessible electronically for authorized individuals, such as transplant coordinators of organ procurement organizations and personnel from hospital intensive care units. To avoid abuse, a waiting period is necessary between registration and the moment when priority can be granted.^[89](#fn89){ref-type="fn"}^ This safeguard addresses the risk of strategic behavior, ie individuals registering only once they are sick and in need of an organ. Registered donors can revoke their consent at any given moment.

Israel offers the incentive of allocation priority for registered donors as part of its public policy to promote organ donation. As the Israeli system is one of the few currently operating incentives in the world, we will present this example in greater detail below.^[90](#fn90){ref-type="fn"}^

**'**Allocation priority', based on reciprocity, is also conceivable for **'**living donation'. Such an incentive grants priority for organs from deceased donors to living donors should the need occur in the future.^[91](#fn91){ref-type="fn"}^ Living donors receive waiting list priority since they not only express willingness to donate but actually give up an organ. Such an incentive reassures living donors that in the event their remaining kidney fails, it is likely that they receive another one promptly. Some states currently grant allocation priority to living donors. The United Network for Organ Sharing in the USA, for example, operates an allocation priority system for living donors.^[92](#fn92){ref-type="fn"}^

IV.C.. Financial incentives {#sec4-3}
---------------------------

Tax credits, discounts on health insurance premiums, and contributions to funeral costs are **'**indirect financial incentives'. They offer a symbolic reward for the gesture of donation.^[93](#fn93){ref-type="fn"}^

A 'tax credit' is an indirect financial incentive for dead and living donation.^[94](#fn94){ref-type="fn"}^ As an instrument of social policy, tax benefits are by no means exceptional. Donations to charities, for example, can be listed on one\'s tax declaration to claim a credit.^[95](#fn95){ref-type="fn"}^ For dead donation, this incentive offers an annual fixed tax credit (for example, \$500) to individuals who manifest their consent and register as potential organ donors after death.^[96](#fn96){ref-type="fn"}^ Registered donors can retract their consent at any time. They keep the tax benefits for the time they were registered and hence potential organ donors. Granting an annual symbolic tax credit bears fewer risks of abuse than offering a much larger single tax credit the year an individual expresses his consent to donation. It also avoids the tricky question of what happens when an individual withdraws his consent. The introduction of a tax incentive for dead donation necessitates the creation of an official organ donor register.^[97](#fn97){ref-type="fn"}^ As an incentive for living donation, an organ donor receives a one-time tax credit in the year of the donation.^[98](#fn98){ref-type="fn"}^ Tax incentives for living donors are implemented, for example, in some states of the USA.^[99](#fn99){ref-type="fn"}^

A discount on 'health insurance premiums' is another indirect financial incentive for dead and living donation. It offers the advantage of retaining a link with health care.^[100](#fn100){ref-type="fn"}^ For dead donation, the reward is granted to individuals who manifest their consent to organ donation after death.^[101](#fn101){ref-type="fn"}^ Registered donors benefit from an annually fixed discount on their health insurance premiums for every year of registration. The registration can be revoked at any time. This incentive necessitates the creation of an official organ donor register. The Netherlands introduced such an incentive in 2008, offering a discount of 10 percent on annual health insurance premiums, which amounts to a reward of about €120.^[102](#fn102){ref-type="fn"}^ Unfortunately little to nothing is known about whether this system is still operating, and if so, under which circumstances. A discount on health insurance premiums can also be offered as an incentive for living donation. In this case, the discount is granted either only once the year the donation takes place, or as a life-long exemption from health insurance premiums.^[103](#fn103){ref-type="fn"}^

A 'funeral benefit' is also an indirect financial incentive. Here the state participates in covering funeral expenses of deceased donors. A fixed contribution toward funeral costs is offered to the deceased\'s relatives and paid directly to the funeral home.^[104](#fn104){ref-type="fn"}^ In many countries, a similar system of covering funeral expenses is in place for individuals who donate their bodies to research and medical schools for educational purposes. In the context of medical research and education, this long existing incentive is uncontroversial in today\'s society. According to the Nuffield Council, it 'appears to be regarded by both professionals and families as an appropriate acknowledgement of the person\'s gift'.^[105](#fn105){ref-type="fn"}^ An analogous incentive is conceivable to promote organ donation, as the same logic applies for a contribution toward funeral costs of organ donors. In the UK, the Nuffield Council favors such a contribution granted by the National Health Service.^[106](#fn106){ref-type="fn"}^ The US state of Pennsylvania has discussed a regulatory framework for such an incentive. It has not introduced it, however, due to doubts as to its compatibility with the US National Organ Transplant Act.^[107](#fn107){ref-type="fn"}^ Spain operates a publicly funded program offering assistance with funeral expenses to relatives of *post mortem* donors.^[108](#fn108){ref-type="fn"}^

A futures market and a regulated organ market are two **'**direct financial incentives', as they offer a purchase price for an organ.

A 'futures market' is a direct financial incentive for dead donation. According to Hansmann, it can be defined as 'the right to harvest a person\'s organs upon death (...) purchased from him while he is alive and well'.^[109](#fn109){ref-type="fn"}^ The potential seller signs a legally binding sales contract with the state as the only admissible buyer.^[110](#fn110){ref-type="fn"}^ This contract authorizes the state to retrieve the organs upon the seller\'s death in exchange for the payment of a standard price fixed by the regulatory framework.^[111](#fn111){ref-type="fn"}^ The contract is executed once the seller\'s death is confirmed and only in case the organs are suitable for transplantation.^[112](#fn112){ref-type="fn"}^ The purchase price is then transferred to the seller\'s estate or a designated beneficiary.

Finally, a 'regulated organ market' is a direct financial incentive for dead and living donation.^[113](#fn113){ref-type="fn"}^ In a regulated organ market, the state is the sole authorized purchaser ('single buyer concept'). The state buys organs for a fixed price from willing sellers.^[114](#fn114){ref-type="fn"}^ The sellers are either close relatives in the case of *post mortem* donation or the living donor (or seller) in the case of living donation. This incentive involves a 'spot market', in contrast to the above-mentioned 'futures market'.^[115](#fn115){ref-type="fn"}^ Iran is the only state in the world that legally permits a market in kidneys from living donors since 1997.^[116](#fn116){ref-type="fn"}^ The Iranian government provides a fixed compensation of approximately \$1200 plus health insurance coverage for one year. The donor also receives remuneration from the recipient or from charitable organizations. The kidney waiting list in Iran seems to have disappeared within a short period.^[117](#fn117){ref-type="fn"}^ Black market activities have also been eradicated, as the regulated kidney market is accessible only to Iranian donors and recipients.^[118](#fn118){ref-type="fn"}^ One of the negative aspects of the Iranian system is the insufficient medical follow-up care that is provided to donors.^[119](#fn119){ref-type="fn"}^ Also, as several scholars show, the majority of compensated kidney donors in Iran are exposed to financial pressures motivating donation, express dissatisfaction about how the regulated system is administered, and fear social stigma.^[120](#fn120){ref-type="fn"}^

IV.D.. Concrete example: allocation priority in Israel {#sec4-4}
------------------------------------------------------

To date, only a few states have considered incentives as a regulatory tool to promote organ donation in the context of a public policy. One of the exceptions is Israel. In 2008, Israel became the first country in the world to enact legislation incorporating the incentive of allocation priority based on individuals' willingness to donate into its organ procurement system.^[121](#fn121){ref-type="fn"}^

In March 2008, the Israeli Parliament adopted a new Organ Transplantation Law.^[122](#fn122){ref-type="fn"}^ This law was enacted as a response to particularly low organ donation rates. Its primary purpose is to increase the number of organs donated in Israel and curb transplant tourism to developing countries.^[123](#fn123){ref-type="fn"}^ The allocation priority incentive is operational since 1 April 2012.^[124](#fn124){ref-type="fn"}^

The Israeli incentive of allocation priority offers a relative priority on the waiting list, in the form of additional points. The system is based on relative priority: the attitude of a patient toward organ donation is not the only allocation criteria, but one among several. Medical necessity is still the highest priority. However, if two patients on the transplant waiting list have equal medical need for an organ, priority will be given to (a) individuals whose first-degree relative has donated organs after death; (b) non-directed and directed living donors; (c) individuals who expressed their consent to donate organs after death by signing a donor card; (d) individuals whose first-degree relative has signed a donor card.^[125](#fn125){ref-type="fn"}^ These four categories are weighed differently. Categories (a) and (b) are granted top priority, as they involve an actual organ donation that occurred in the past. Category (c) receives second priority, and category (d) third priority.^[126](#fn126){ref-type="fn"}^ Should an individual fall into more than one category, only the highest priority is relevant, as priorities cannot be cumulated. Individuals under the age of 18 and those incapable of giving consent receive relative priority status.^[127](#fn127){ref-type="fn"}^

The Israeli incentive is original because it grants allocation priority to different categories of individuals. It offers reassurance to living donors should they need an organ at some point in their lives (category b). The incentive also intends to motivate individuals to register as potential donors during their lifetime (category c), and to encourage individuals to donate deceased first-degree relatives' organs (category a). Although individuals can register as organ donors, the decision whether to donate organs or not remains with the potential donor\'s first-degree relatives.^[128](#fn128){ref-type="fn"}^ Category a of the priority system thus provides an incentive for the very people expressing consent to organ donation. Furthermore, as an unusual feature, the Israeli system grants priority not only to registered donors, but also to their first-degree relatives who have not signed a donor card (category d). According to Brazier & Harris, this may be explained by the fact that donation 'is perceived as a family enterprise and the "reward" is shared by the family'.^[129](#fn129){ref-type="fn"}^ This prioritization category is problematic though. It allows individuals unwilling to consent to donation themselves to benefit from the good actions of others, ie first-degree relatives.^[130](#fn130){ref-type="fn"}^ Awarding priority to individuals because a first-degree relative has signed an organ donor card is unfair, as it is unrelated to an individual\'s behavior and intent, and does not adhere to the concept of reciprocity. It also advantages individuals with an extended family.

The Israeli Organ Transplantation Law imposes a three-year waiting period, ie individuals have to be registered as a potential organ donor for three years before they can potentially claim to benefit from the allocation priority.^[131](#fn131){ref-type="fn"}^

Public awareness campaigns explaining the allocation priority system at all levels of education within the population are essential to guarantee equality among potential patients. The introduction of the incentive in Israel was thus accompanied by a large multilingual campaign about organ donation through various media channels such as radio, TV, billboards, and newspaper ads.^[132](#fn132){ref-type="fn"}^

The response of the population was significant. Numerous individuals registered as potential organ donors. During the 10 weeks of the public awareness campaign preceding the new law\'s implementation, 70,000 Israelis signed up for organ donor cards. In addition to the substantial rise in newly registered potential donors, consent rates for deceased organ donation increased, and the number of organs available for transplantation rose in parallel.^[133](#fn133){ref-type="fn"}^ The preliminary and short-term data on the effectiveness of the new Israeli allocation priority system as a regulatory tool for improving donation rates thus seemed positive.^[134](#fn134){ref-type="fn"}^

A recent study evaluating in more detail the first five years after the adoption of the new incentive comes to the same conclusion.^[135](#fn135){ref-type="fn"}^ The study shows that Israel\'s allocation priority incentive has so far had a substantial effect on organ donor registrations and authorization rates for organ donation. Most importantly, it highlights that this effect goes significantly beyond the increased awareness created through the large information campaigns, which took place before the incentive was implemented in 2012. According to the study, the authorization rate for organ donation reached an all-time high rate of 60 percent in 2015.^[136](#fn136){ref-type="fn"}^ Interestingly, this increase was mainly due to an increase in the authorization rate of next of kin of unregistered donors (51.1% vs 42.2%), an increase which is probably linked to the incentive\'s priority category a.^[137](#fn137){ref-type="fn"}^ The study also found that the likelihood of next-of-kin authorization for donation was approximately twice as high when the deceased relative was a registered donor rather than unregistered (89.4% vs 44.6%).^[138](#fn138){ref-type="fn"}^ This result reveals the importance of increasing organ donor registrations through the allocation priority incentive, as 'more registrations translate into a higher likelihood that authorization for donation will be granted'.^[139](#fn139){ref-type="fn"}^ Considering the overall positive results, it appears that Israel\'s nuanced regulatory design of its incentive, offering allocation priority not only to registered potential organ donors but also to next of kin that authorize organ retrieval on deceased donors, is key to its success. These nuances speak to the various motives that can underlie the decision to donate and take into account that in reality organ donation is not only an individual decision but also a family matter. Finally, one may note that the priority incentive has a real practical impact on organ allocation in Israel. In 2014, 30 percent of transplanted patients were advanced in line based on their priority status; in 2015, this percentage increased to 32 percent.^[140](#fn140){ref-type="fn"}^

The incentive introduced in Israel thus serves as a promising regulatory example for other states, as it is likely to make more organs available for transplantation. It will be interesting to monitor if the positive effect on the number of individuals registered as organ donors and organs donated persists over time.

V.. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS {#sec5}
=====================

V.A.. Prohibition of organ sales {#sec5-1}
--------------------------------

From a legal perspective, state incentives for organ donation raise a crucial question: Are they compatible with the prohibition of organ sales and, more generally, the prohibition of deriving benefit from the human body and its parts?

The prohibition of organ sales is enacted first of all in international law. The Council of Europe\'s *Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine* is the most important reference here.^[141](#fn141){ref-type="fn"}^ This convention imposes legally binding obligations on the 29 member states having ratified its text. According to article 21 ('Prohibition of financial gain'), '(t)he human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain'. Article 21 of the Council of Europe\'s *Additional Protocol on Transplantation*^[142](#fn142){ref-type="fn"}^ refines the prohibition established by the convention by excluding not only financial gain but also any other comparable advantage in exchange for an organ. The same article allows for exceptions to this rule, such as compensation of living donors for loss of earnings and other justifiable expenses. Article 22 of the *Additional Protocol on Transplantation* prohibits organ trafficking.^[143](#fn143){ref-type="fn"}^

Other international norms also refer to the prohibition of organ sales. A prominent legally non-binding text is the *Resolution on the Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation* adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO).^[144](#fn144){ref-type="fn"}^ Principle 5 states that organs 'should only be donated freely, without any monetary payment or other reward of monetary value. Purchasing, or offering to purchase (...) organs for transplantation, or their sale by living persons or by the next of kin for deceased persons, should be banned'. The *WHO Guiding Principles* allow for compensation of expenses for living donation.

The European Union legal framework is also relevant, as it imposes legally binding obligations on the 26 member states. Article 3 ('Right to the integrity of the person') of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* imposes a 'prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain'.^[145](#fn145){ref-type="fn"}^ According to Article 13 of *Directive 2010/45/EU*, 'donations of organs from deceased and living donors are voluntary and unpaid'.^[146](#fn146){ref-type="fn"}^ This 'principle of non-payment' does not exclude compensation of expenses for living donors.

The prohibition of organ sales is a broadly recognized legal principle, not only in international, but also in domestic law.^[147](#fn147){ref-type="fn"}^ It is enacted on a national level by most legal systems in the developed world.^[148](#fn148){ref-type="fn"}^ The literature occasionally describes the prohibition of organ sales as a global legal principle, as the ban is, *de jure* at least, nearly global.^[149](#fn149){ref-type="fn"}^ The prohibition of organ sales is not an absolute legal principle tough, as it is subject to exceptions. In many states, regulation of living donation allows for financial compensation (eg reimbursement of lost income, time off work, travel and medical expenses, life and disability insurance).^[150](#fn150){ref-type="fn"}^

To evaluate the compatibility of state incentives with the prohibition of organ sales, the underlying normative rationale becomes relevant. An analysis of its normative history and intent shows that this legal principle prohibits private commercial transactions involving money between the donor, the recipient, and third parties (eg organ brokers, intermediaries).^[151](#fn151){ref-type="fn"}^ The prohibition of organ sales intends to prevent abuse in transplantation medicine. Its purpose is to (a) protect donors and recipients, who are in a vulnerable position, by preserving their dignity and avoiding undue inducement and exploitation; (b) guarantee equal access to organs, unrelated to a patient\'s capacity and willingness to pay; (c) maintain safety in transplantation medicine; and (d) combat transplant tourism and organ trafficking.

Within a legal framework honoring the prohibition to derive benefit from the human body and its parts, there is a strong normative position against attributing a monetary value to organs and making them part of private commercial dealings between individuals.^[152](#fn152){ref-type="fn"}^ However, state incentives promoting consent to organ donation are not equivalent to a purchase price for an organ.^[153](#fn153){ref-type="fn"}^ They neither assign a monetary value to organs nor involve them in commercial transactions.^[154](#fn154){ref-type="fn"}^ An incentive is a public policy instrument,^[155](#fn155){ref-type="fn"}^ a reward for the gesture of donation, which is a generous act of solidarity with patients in need and society.^[156](#fn156){ref-type="fn"}^ It 'is understood, by all parties, in terms of reward to the person for their act of providing bodily material, rather than a purchase of material itself'.^[157](#fn157){ref-type="fn"}^

State incentives do hence not violate the prohibition of organ sales and are in line with its underlying normative rationale, under certain conditions. Adequate and proportionate expressions of appreciation and gratitude by the state in the context of a public policy are compatible with existing legal frameworks prohibiting organ sales. Satel et al. suggest a 'reasonableness standard' for evaluating state incentives designed to encourage organ donation.^[158](#fn158){ref-type="fn"}^ We argue here that as public policy instruments, non-financial and indirect financial incentives pass the reasonableness test. Direct financial incentives (ie regulated organ market; futures market) have to be ruled out though. As they offer a purchase price and implicate legally binding sales contracts, they violate the prohibition of organ sales.^[159](#fn159){ref-type="fn"}^

For future law reform introducing state incentives, it is advisable to amend present legal frameworks on organ procurement and clarify that such incentives do not violate the prohibition of organ sales.^[160](#fn160){ref-type="fn"}^ The regulatory technique of creating an exception for state incentives can be applied in an analogous way to how current regulations circumscribe compensation for living donors.^[161](#fn161){ref-type="fn"}^ Another example is how regulations of scientific research allow for coverage of funeral expenses for individuals who donate their bodies to research or medical education after death.

V.B.. Just allocation of organs {#sec5-2}
-------------------------------

Beyond the prohibition of organ sales, state incentives raise other legal issues. For non-financial incentives, the central question refers to the just allocation of organs, as medical resources are to be distributed based on medical need and not merit.^[162](#fn162){ref-type="fn"}^ The just allocation of organs is an expression of the legal principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

Both international and domestic laws explicitly and implicitly adhere to the just allocation of organs. Article 3 of the Council of Europe\'s *Additional Protocol on Transplantation*, for example, states that organs shall be allocated in conformity with transparent, objective, and duly justified rules according to medical criteria. Within national legal frameworks, organs are generally allocated based on the following criteria: medical urgency, medical efficiency (ie compatibility between donor and recipient), and waiting time.^[163](#fn163){ref-type="fn"}^

Granting allocation priority to registered donors adds a criterion. It takes into account a patient\'s previously expressed willingness to donate and attributes a certain priority on the waiting list to patients who are registered organ donors. An individual\'s registration to donate organs after death is not a medical criterion though. Does offering allocation priority for registered donors thus violate the principle of just allocation of organs and equal treatment and non-discrimination more generally?^[164](#fn164){ref-type="fn"}^

First of all, today\'s organ allocation system does not adhere to medical criteria only. The time spent on the waiting list is not strictly speaking a medical criterion. Also, organs obtained through directed living donation between family members are not allocated according to medical criteria. Organ allocation in living donation depends on a patient\'s 'moral luck' in having an extended family or other social network willing to go through donor screening and eventually consent to be a living donor.^[165](#fn165){ref-type="fn"}^

Second, a patient\'s status as a registered organ donor is an objective and transparent criterion.^[166](#fn166){ref-type="fn"}^ It is distinct from social worth criteria such as one\'s political function, eg a head of state, one\'s profession, such as a doctor, or one\'s family status, eg a mother of four young children.^[167](#fn167){ref-type="fn"}^ Social worth criteria are inherently subjective and thus incompatible with the principle of just allocation of organs. Furthermore, it is critical to acknowledge that transplantation medicine cannot exist without organ donors. There is a close conceptual and causal link between individuals' willingness to donate and the number of organs available.^[168](#fn168){ref-type="fn"}^ As such, allocation priority is not a morally arbitrary factor for the distribution of the scarce good of human organs.^[169](#fn169){ref-type="fn"}^

Third, potential donors having manifested their willingness to donate are in a different position than individuals opposing organ donation after death. The previously expressed donative intent of some patients on the waiting list is sufficient to categorize them as dissimilar and hence allows for treating them differently. Although social values and context may influence an individual\'s stance on organ donation, it cannot be considered as an inherent or deeply rooted part of his personality that is not susceptible to change. In addition, treating individuals differently according to their manifested willingness to donate organs does not entail a negative value judgement of non-donors. The decision of individuals who due to religious or cultural beliefs refuse to donate their organs after death has to be respected in all circumstances. It is morally doubtful though that an individual refusing donation due to such beliefs demands to benefit from the very same generosity or 'sacrifice' that he is not willing to make himself.^[170](#fn170){ref-type="fn"}^ The allocation priority incentive does not exclude such 'free riders' from receiving an organ, but allocates a preference for registered donors in case of equal medical need.^[171](#fn171){ref-type="fn"}^

Finally, allocation priority for registered donors is a criterion that promotes important social values, as it relates to solidarity among the members of a society.^[172](#fn172){ref-type="fn"}^ It also concretizes the principle of justice and realizes the concept of reciprocity, which as discussed above is an inherent and essential attribute of the act of donation.^[173](#fn173){ref-type="fn"}^

Granting allocation priority does hence not *a priori* violate the principles of just allocation of organs, equal treatment, and non-discrimination. However, as all regulatory tools, such a state incentive has to comply with the principle of proportionality. Only an incentive that offers relative priority, and not an absolute one, is proportionate. Designed in this manner, the registration as an organ donor is one among several allocation criteria. Moreover, a system granting allocation priority to registered donors has to take into account special circumstances, such as 'super urgent' patients, children, and adults incapable of giving valid consent, and allow for exceptions in these cases.^[174](#fn174){ref-type="fn"}^

V.C.. Voluntary consent {#sec5-3}
-----------------------

Financial incentives raise the question of voluntary consent. Consent is the legal and ethical cornerstone of all medical interventions, its purpose being to protect an individual\'s autonomy and physical integrity. Article 5 of the Council of Europe\'s *Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine* and articles 13 and 17 of its *Additional Protocol on Transplantation* require freedom of consent for organ donation. The same is true for domestic legal frameworks.^[175](#fn175){ref-type="fn"}^

Offering a significant sum of money to an individual struggling with financial difficulties may affect his capacity to consent to organ donation freely. Many scholars express concern for the risk of undue inducement or coercion of destitute individuals when considering exchanges of money and organs.^[176](#fn176){ref-type="fn"}^ However, state incentives first and foremost value the donor\'s or his relatives' consent. They are not necessarily incompatible with the requirement of voluntary consent, depending on the incentives' modalities and the safeguards enacted. Most importantly, financial incentives must adhere to the principle of proportionality.

For *post mortem* donation, the issue of undue inducement is less relevant, since there is no harm to the donor or his relatives, and one does not need one\'s organs after death. Living donation is more challenging because the donor agrees to assume health risks. As such, the safeguards to be implemented relate to the following aspects.^[177](#fn177){ref-type="fn"}^ First, a meticulous screening process of potential donors is necessary, including medical and psychological evaluation. Second, a waiting period between the decision to donate and the actual donation gives the donor the opportunity to reflect and reconsider. Third, a non-cash (ie indirect financial) reward, possibly granted in installments spread over time, allows excluding individuals desperate for money. The installments can also be linked to the donor\'s adherence to medical follow-up.

Indirect financial incentives granting a symbolic reward, if possible spread over time, do not exercise undue inducement on the potential donor or his close relatives.^[178](#fn178){ref-type="fn"}^ Such incentives fulfill the requirement of voluntary consent. A regulated market or a futures market are problematic, however, as they offer a considerable amount of money and thus raise concerns about the quality of consent.^[179](#fn179){ref-type="fn"}^

V.D.. Recognition of property rights in organs {#sec5-4}
----------------------------------------------

Finally, financial incentives raise the question of property rights in organs. A regulated organ market and a futures market imply signing a legally binding sales contract involving organs between the potential seller or his relatives and the state. Recognition of property rights in organs is, therefore, necessary to realize these two direct financial incentives.^[180](#fn180){ref-type="fn"}^ Is the seller himself holder of such rights, or are his relatives?

From a theoretical point of view, the concept of property rights in organs is not *a priori* impossible to conceive of.^[181](#fn181){ref-type="fn"}^ The recognition of such rights remains controversial though, both among scholars and in cases adjudicated by courts in various jurisdictions.^[182](#fn182){ref-type="fn"}^ This controversy constitutes another valid reason, although more pragmatic than normative, to rule out the direct financial incentives of a regulated organ market and a futures market.

VI.. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS {#sec6}
===========================

The positive consequences of an increased number of available organs are manifest. Promoting organ donation is hence not only ethically justifiable but also necessary.^[183](#fn183){ref-type="fn"}^ The question is not whether the state should encourage individuals' willingness to donate, but how. State incentives raise ethical issues though. We will address some of the most relevant ones, without claiming to depict an exhaustive picture of the ethical discussion here.

VI.A.. Origin of organs and exploitation {#sec6-1}
----------------------------------------

Unlike a system of presumed consent, incentives for organ donation value the donor\'s autonomy and demand explicit consent.^[184](#fn184){ref-type="fn"}^ However, based on consequentialist reasoning and the liberal concept of individual autonomy, incentives raise the question of the organs' origin.

Donors may disproportionately come from lower socioeconomic parts of society. Schneider notes the risk of 'socio-economic selectivity in donor recruitment'.^[185](#fn185){ref-type="fn"}^ Destitute individuals are more likely to accept financial incentives than those who are well-off. A certain asymmetry in organ procurement in a state incentivized system is probably unavoidable. This concern of equity and distributive justice as to the burden of providing organs for transplantation is in our opinion the most problematic point of encouraged donation.

However, is this asymmetry in organ procurement equivalent to state-sponsored exploitation of the poor? Unfortunately, societal asymmetry is not a phenomenon unique to encouraged organ donation. In many areas of life, individuals from a lower socioeconomic background more often perform tasks implicating a particular risk or burden.^[186](#fn186){ref-type="fn"}^ Incentivized organ donation at least benefits the entire population, irrespective of one\'s financial situation, through a larger pool of available organs.^[187](#fn187){ref-type="fn"}^

The welfare of the donor and the potential for harm and exploitation are key considerations when designing a system of state incentives.^[188](#fn188){ref-type="fn"}^ To alleviate the potential asymmetry and avoid exploitation of donors, safeguards have to be implemented.^[189](#fn189){ref-type="fn"}^ These safeguards pertain to assuring that consent to donate one\'s organs is voluntary and informed. We have discussed above safeguards such as screening potential living donors, imposing a waiting period, and granting incentives in installments over time.^[190](#fn190){ref-type="fn"}^ Also, the issue of exploitation renders non-financial incentives such as allocation priority particularly attractive, as the reward they provide is appealing to everyone, independently of an individual\'s wealth.^[191](#fn191){ref-type="fn"}^

VI.B.. Commodification of the human body {#sec6-2}
----------------------------------------

Incentives also raise the issue of the human body as a potential source of commercial activity and financial gain. The *Declaration of Istanbul*, adopted in 2008 at an international conference organized by the Transplantation Society and the International Society of Nephrology, defines transplant commercialism as a 'policy or practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity, including by being bought or sold or used for material gain'.^[192](#fn192){ref-type="fn"}^

Relying on deontological reasoning, numerous scholars criticize transplant commercialism and commodification of the human body more generally, based on the view that the human body is exceptional.^[193](#fn193){ref-type="fn"}^ However, this principled critic is usually directed toward private commercial transactions and markets involving human body parts.

Can state incentives impair individuals' and society\'s respect for the integrity of the human body? Do such incentives lead to transplant commercialism and commodification? Current legal frameworks do not allow for organs to be tradable objects with monetary value. Offering state incentives reflects a conceptually different approach though. These public policy tools value the act of donation and express society\'s gratitude and appreciation for the donor.^[194](#fn194){ref-type="fn"}^ Incentives take into account the concept of reciprocity that is inherent in the act of donation. According to Schweda & Schicktanz, incentives 'correspond to the reciprocal spirit of gift exchange and do not adhere to a profit-oriented logic of the marketplace'.^[195](#fn195){ref-type="fn"}^ They hence contribute to a more accurate expression of the gift relationship in transplantation medicine.

VI.C.. Threat to altruism {#sec6-3}
-------------------------

A communitarian ethical argument relates to the threat to altruism that incentives might pose. Considering the organ shortage, altruism alone is an unsuccessful doctrine in transplantation medicine.^[196](#fn196){ref-type="fn"}^ However, it should continue to play a central role in ethical thinking about organ donation. As the Nuffield Council states, the 'idea of altruistic donation---giving bodily material because another person needs it---underpins a communal and collective approach where generosity and compassion are valued'.^[197](#fn197){ref-type="fn"}^ We argue here that altruism should remain at the heart of donation, as it reflects important community values. However, this does not exclude the possibility of introducing a reward.^[198](#fn198){ref-type="fn"}^

State incentives for organ donation are conceived as a facilitator for altruism.^[199](#fn199){ref-type="fn"}^ They are neither threat nor replacement. Incentivized donation retains an altruistic component and preserves the solidary character of the act of donation, although other motives may play a role as well. As Barnieh et al. note, 'assuming that incentives obliterate all altruistic motives is undoubtedly too simple a picture for human behavior'.^[200](#fn200){ref-type="fn"}^ Promoting desirable prosocial behavior through incentives is a standard tool in the arsenal of state regulation. Offering tax incentives to encourage monetary donations to charitable organizations for example, and thus rewarding generous individuals who do something good, is a common and well-accepted public policy instrument. Such a tax credit does not undermine the altruistic intent of the donor. As Petersen & Lippert-Rasmussen state, 'tax breaks for ordinary donations to charity have not changed their meaning such that they are no longer thought of as gifts'.^[201](#fn201){ref-type="fn"}^

Altruism and state incentives to encourage individuals' willingness to donate are hence not mutually exclusive.^[202](#fn202){ref-type="fn"}^ Donation of certain body parts, which allows for compensation, such as sperm and egg donation, is still considered a donation, and not an act adhering to market principles only. By communicating a message of gratitude and appreciation, state incentives do not bring about a systemic change in today\'s conception of organ donation.^[203](#fn203){ref-type="fn"}^ Incentives have 'the potential to achieve significantly increased donation rates within the existing gift law paradigm', as they honor the gift relationship.^[204](#fn204){ref-type="fn"}^ Implemented in the context of a public policy, they preserve the paradigm of donation as a generous and solidary act, not only with recipients but also with society.

VI.D.. National self-sufficiency and global social justice {#sec6-4}
----------------------------------------------------------

An ethical analysis of state incentives for organ donation has to reflect on transnational or global issues. The occurrence of transplant tourism and organ trafficking is evident.^[205](#fn205){ref-type="fn"}^ In most cases, it involves patients unable or unwilling to wait for an organ in their developed country of origin. They thus travel to a developing country, in which the prohibition of organ sales is not (sufficiently) enforced, and buy an organ from a destitute and vulnerable local 'donor'.

This exploitative situation is problematic. It is inherently unfair to export the 'developed world' problem of organ shortage to developing countries. Based on a framework of global social justice, states have a moral responsibility to aim for and achieve national self-sufficiency of organs within their borders.^[206](#fn206){ref-type="fn"}^ In the literature, calls are made for government accountability to achieve national self-sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation. Delmonico et al. note that 'a new paradigm of national self-sufficiency is urgently needed', and '(g)overnments can no longer abdicate responsibility for the organ donation and transplantation needs of their people'.^[207](#fn207){ref-type="fn"}^ The *Declaration of Istanbul* of 2008 contains similar claims.^[208](#fn208){ref-type="fn"}^

The extent and practical details of this accountability, and possible means to achieve national self-sufficiency, vary in the literature. One aspect, however, is certain. By striving to establish national self-sufficiency in kidneys and reducing waiting lists, the developed world can diminish its contribution to the demand driving today\'s black market activities.^[209](#fn209){ref-type="fn"}^

VII.. PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF INCENTIVES {#sec7}
====================================================

VII.A.. Design of information campaigns {#sec7-1}
---------------------------------------

Reinforcing the population\'s trust in the transplantation system and building a positive societal climate for organ donation are important objectives. Appropriate public health communication has to accompany the introduction of incentives, as a necessary pillar of effective public policy. The purpose of information campaigns is to raise the public\'s awareness of the organ shortage, change social attitudes toward donation, and bring about social change.

We argue here that the contributory causes of the organ shortage are to be highlighted in these campaigns. Through public health communication, the state informs the population about the impact of civilization diseases on the growing need for organs.^[210](#fn210){ref-type="fn"}^ This is a novel and crucial point. Today it is not part of public knowledge that the rising prevalence of obesity, hypertension, and type 2 diabetes steadily increases the need for kidney transplantation.

The organ shortage remains an abstract and unspecific concern for a majority of the population. Linking civilization diseases, which are omnipresent in public discourse, to the need for organs confronts individuals with an obvious and concrete need. It is an issue everyone can relate to personally, which might address the attitude/action gap and thus facilitate the decision to consent to organ donation. Within the same framework, public health communication can also expose the fact that one is much more likely to be in need of an organ transplant one day than to become an actual organ donor, ie to die in circumstances that allow for organ retrieval.^[211](#fn211){ref-type="fn"}^

Furthermore, it is crucial to communicate that 75 percent of patients on the waiting list need a kidney.^[212](#fn212){ref-type="fn"}^ Svenaeus has recently provided detailed phenomenological analyses of the connection between transplantable body parts and the personal identity of those who provide or receive them.^[213](#fn213){ref-type="fn"}^ According to another study by Sperling & Gurman, kidneys do not have a very symbolic meaning.^[214](#fn214){ref-type="fn"}^ They do not play an essential role in one\'s perception of self or one\'s 'sense of self'. Kidneys are thus less connected to personal identity, in contrast to other organs, such as the eyes or the heart. Sperling & Gurman show that there is a significant link between the closeness of an organ to a donor\'s sense of self and his willingness to donate. Public health communication should, therefore, emphasize the need for kidneys to display a concrete need individuals can relate to. Campaigns refocused in this manner can lower internal barriers that individuals encounter when contemplating organ donation as an abstract concept, and facilitate expression of consent to kidney donation.

VII.B.. Public opinion, effectiveness, and legitimacy {#sec7-2}
-----------------------------------------------------

Transplantation medicine thrives on trust in its abilities and integrity. Beard & Leitzel describe this trust as an 'independent public good'.^[215](#fn215){ref-type="fn"}^ Trust is an issue because of the particular circumstances surrounding *post mortem* organ donation. If this trust is damaged by the introduction of state incentives, current rates of organs donated might fall even further. It is well documented in the literature that in the aftermath of scandals related to listing and allocation decisions donation rates tend to drop.^[216](#fn216){ref-type="fn"}^ State incentives thus have to be regulated and implemented so as not to interfere with the public\'s trust. Transparency regarding the incentives offered and criteria used for donor qualification and organ allocation is of utmost importance to maintain and reinforce this trust.

Public perception and acceptance of state incentives are empirical questions. The same is true for the effectiveness of such incentives in increasing donation rates. Opinion polls have tested the public\'s attitude toward incentives throughout the developed world. These polls show a nuanced picture of the public\'s support for or opposition against incentives. Appropriate and proportionate incentives are received in a rather positive manner, whereas market approaches including a cash payment are generally opposed.^[217](#fn217){ref-type="fn"}^ Schweda & Schicktanz describe that '"the relevant and precarious demarcation line between what is viewed as acceptable or not does not seem to set monetary against non-monetary forms of incentives, but rather the reciprocal spirit of gift exchange against the profit-oriented logic of the marketplace. (...T)his perspective implies that models involving money are not perceived as objectionable per se, as long as they are compatible with the principle of reciprocity, which holds true e.g. for forms of compensation and 'rewarded giftin'.^[218](#fn218){ref-type="fn"}^"

These results call for careful consideration, as reported patterns of potential behavior may not translate entirely into actual behavior of expressing consent to organ donation. However, they support our conceptual development of state incentives as an alternative to the altruism versus market dichotomy.

The legitimacy of state incentives eventually depends on their ability to boost the number of organs: '(m)oving away from a system based solely on altruism would only be worthwhile if there is good reason to believe that it will achieve this aim'.^[219](#fn219){ref-type="fn"}^ Introducing state incentives through pilot projects is hence an appropriate regulatory approach. Such projects will help understanding how financial or non-financial incentives influence individuals' willingness to donate.^[220](#fn220){ref-type="fn"}^ The empirical question of whether incentives are an effective tool to improve donation rates can only be tested in real life.

Since non-financial and financial incentives are well-established public policy tools, in particular in public health, we can expect that the same approach fits organ donation too.^[221](#fn221){ref-type="fn"}^ Introducing incentives thus has a promising potential for expanding organ availability. Finally, the results of the allocation priority incentive introduced in Israel in 2012 are encouraging, as the number of organs donated has increased significantly so far.

VIII.. CONCLUSIONS {#sec8}
==================

Promotion of organ donation has become an important public health issue, as the situation of transplantation medicine in the developed world is critical. We have described here the empirical data of the organ shortage and its medical, social, and economic consequences. The current situation will deteriorate if today\'s legal frameworks for organ procurement remain the same, considering the challenges of an aging population, a serious growth in civilization diseases, no alternative treatments in the foreseeable future and considerable health care costs. At this point, the organ shortage cannot be addressed by scientific or medical advances, but rather requires political action and regulatory solutions.

Reducing the organ shortage has many desirable consequences. First of all, fewer patients succumb to organ failure and die. Second, the quality of life of individuals waiting for an organ improves, notably for the many patients undergoing dialysis. Third, the cost burden for health care systems is alleviated, since kidney transplantation presents a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio as a treatment for end-stage renal disease. Fourth, wider availability of organs is medically advantageous, as it allows for improved quality of donor--recipient matches and reduction of second transplants. Finally, transplant tourism and organ trafficking in developing countries decrease.

Based on the critical public interests at stake, we argue that it is the state\'s responsibility to further the availability of organs for transplantation purposes. The distinctive role of the state in transplantation medicine is one of stewardship, for patients waiting for an organ and organ donation more generally.

In analogy to other public health problems, the state can implement various regulatory tools to fight the organ shortage. From a public health perspective, the state has not only an obligation to promote organ donation (supply side) but also to reduce the need for organs by improving population health (demand side). Rising levels of obesity, high blood pressure, and diabetes contribute to the demand for kidneys. Public health initiatives designed to induce healthier lifestyles and aimed at preventing end-stage organ failure are thus crucial. In this paper, however, we focus on the regulatory tool of incentives to encourage individuals to express their consent to donate. We suggest here that incentives supplement other ways of aligning organ demand and supply.

State incentives adhere to a system of rewarded donation, situated between altruism and pure profit. This alternative approach overthrows the traditional and unconvincing gift versus market dichotomy. Through incentives, the state honors the act of solidarity of the donor in favor of the recipient and society. A reward for donors or their relatives is thus best viewed as a facilitator for altruism, rather than a replacement. Public policy incentives support individual choice and promote communitarian interests. The paradigm of donation as a generous and solidary act is preserved, as no systemic change is forced upon current organ procurement practices. Moreover, state incentives take into account the crucial attributes of reciprocity and mixed motives underlying organ donation.

The key criterion for the regulatory design of incentives is the adequate and proportionate expression of appreciation and gratitude by the state for the act of organ donation. Conceived as such, incentives promote individuals' willingness to donate, without violating the prohibition of organ sales. They maintain a strong normative position against private commercial transactions involving organs. With adequate safeguards in place, there are no decisive objections to using incentives in a public policy to promote organ donation.

State incentives have to ensure respect, benefit, and protection from harm for both the donor (and his relatives) and the recipient. Certain incentives are thus preferable from a legal and ethical point of view: first, incentives for *post mortem* donation, since they do not imply harming the physical integrity of a healthy individual and do not involve risks for the donor; second, non-financial incentives, as they better guarantee the quality of the donor\'s consent; finally, for the same reasons, indirect financial incentives as opposed to direct financial ones. Considering the various incentives discussed here, this leaves us with the following result.

Direct financial incentives (futures market, regulated organ market) assign a monetary value to organs and, therefore, violate the prohibition of organ sales, a legal principle widely enacted in international and domestic law. There is a clear normative tendency toward avoiding the full commercialization of body material, in particular organs. Introducing direct financial incentives implies recognizing a property right in organs and abandoning the prohibition of organ sales. A public policy based on such incentives has thus to be ruled out. The effectiveness of indirect financial incentives for living donation (reduction of health insurance premiums, tax credits) seems arguable. Today living donation remains an act that in most cases occurs within close familial or affectionate relationships. The introduction of incentives would probably not have a significant impact in this regard.

However, legally and ethically acceptable regulatory tools exist to ease the organ shortage and the suffering of patients in need. The incentive of allocation priority for registered donors, in particular, communicates a compelling and straightforward message: give and receive. It relates to the concepts of solidarity and reciprocity among the members of a given society. Reciprocity is a key element in sociological gift exchange theory. Combined with a public awareness campaign focusing on civilization diseases and the risk of needing a kidney at some point in one\'s life, this incentive is a convincing tool to increase the number of individuals who manifest their willingness to donate organs after death. Israel has introduced an allocation priority incentive in April 2012. The first empirical results published since its implementation are very positive. The Israeli system has to be carefully monitored to follow its effectiveness in expanding the number of available organs over time. Eventually, the legitimacy of any incentive depends on its ability to boost the number of organs donated.

Indirect financial incentives (tax credits, reduction of health insurance premiums) are an appealing means to increase the number of individuals who express consent to *post mortem* organ donation during their lifetime. Indirect financial incentives can also address close relatives after a potential donor\'s death (participation in funeral expenses). Although such incentives involve spending public funds, they most likely do not cause an overall increment in public expenditure. As they increase the number of organs transplanted, costs elsewhere in the health care system, dialysis costs most importantly, can be reduced. Having more organs available also allows for decreased spending within the social security system, as transplanted patients usually return to the workforce.

State incentives constitute a convincing remedy to address the organ shortage and its serious consequences. They offer a promising solution to improve the situation of patients in need. In an attempt to re-equilibrate the gift relationship, the public policy suggested here acknowledges a generous act, takes into account the diverse motives underlying organ donation, and combines altruism with an emphasis on reciprocity and solidarity. Legal and ethical concerns raised by the introduction of incentives can be accommodated through adequate regulatory design. The example of Israel\'s legal framework might lead the way for other states to follow, as Israel is in the unique position to have successfully implemented such an incentive.

Mélanie Levy is an adjunct lecturer at the Weizmann Institute of Science (from 2017) and the Buchmann Faculty of Law at Tel Aviv University (from 2018) in Israel. She obtained her Ph.D. in Law from the University of Neuchatel (Switzerland) and her LL.M. from Cambridge University (UK). Her research interests lie at the intersection of law, medicine, technology, and society.
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